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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
HEBER CREEPER, INC., : 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent and : 
Cross-Appellant, 
-v-
GORDON MENDENHALL and 
LEON RITCHIE, : 
Appellants and : No. 20952 
Cross-Respondents. 
00O00 c 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The ultimate issues in this appeal are, rather than the 
three numbered in Appellants1 brief at i[ts page 2: 
1. whether the trial court correctly determined that 
Heber Creeper, Inc. was entitled, by a ifair preponderance of the 
evidence, to be awarded Judgment against Gordon Mendenhall and 
Leon Ritchie in the orincipal amount of at least $17,385.00; and 
2. whether the trial court er^ed in failing to deter-
mine that Heber Creeper, Inc. had provecji, by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence, that Heber Creeper, Incf. was entitled to be 
awarded judgment against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie 
in substantially larger sums. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSft-APPEAL 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position is that, at a minimum, 
the trial court's judgment against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. 
- 1 -
Ritchie should be affirmed. Heber Creeper, Inc. seeks herein 
also to have the trial courtfs Judgment modified to award damages 
against Gordon Mendenhall in the total principal amount of 
$299,194.00 and to award damages against Leon Ritchie in the 
total principal amount of $52,475.00. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed by Heber Creeper, Inc., a Utah 
for-profit corporation, against Gordon Mendenhall and Leon 
Ritchie in the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, on 
December 30, 1982. It was tried to the bench (Hon. Cullen Y. 
Christensen) on March 11, 12, 13, and 19, 1985. 
The dispute concerns itself, generally, with the 
question of the duty of care and loyalty of directors of a for-
profit corporation to the corporation, and, more specifically, 
with questions including the temporal duration of that duty and 
the answerability in damages to the corporation in the event that 
the duty is breached. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Heber Creeper, Inc. respectfully submits that the 
"Statement of Facts" appearing at pages 2 through 4 of 
Appellants1 Brief is both incomplete and, in many respects, inac-
curate, and submits for the Court's consideration, in lieu 
thereof, the following relevant and indisputable facts patterned 
larqely after the trial court's Findings appearing at cages 
numbered 32 through 42 of Appellants' Brief): 
1. Heber Creeper, Inc. is a Utah business corporation 
which was incorporated on or about January 7, 1971 as Wasatch 
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Railway and Development Co. and whose nafae was duly changed, on 
or about June 28, 1972, to its present nftme. Exs. 10, 1; tr. at 
50, 56. 
2. Gordon Mendenhall was an incorporator of Heber 
Creeper, Inc. and was a director of the (corporation uninterrup-
tedly from the time of incorporation unt|il December 1981. Ex. 
10; tr. at 50, 55, 57-58, 217, 392-93. 
3. Mr. Mendenhall was also a djirector of Heber Creeoer, 
Inc. from May 14, 1982 until at least Ju|ne 22, 1982. Ex. 10; Ex. 
14; tr. at 169, 217-18, 392-93. 
4. Mr. Mendenhall was an off icier (vice-oresident) of 
Heber Creeper, Inc. from 1975 through 1979 and was again an 
officer (secretary-treasurer) of the corporation from May 14, 
1982 until at least June 22, 1982. Ex. 10; Ex. 14; tr. at 
217-18, 392-93. 
5. Leon Ritchie was an incorporator of Heber Creeper, 
Inc. and was an original director of thq corooration and a direc-
tor during the years 1971, 1972, 1979, c*nd 1980, as well. Ex. 
10; tr. at 50, 55-56, 59. 
6. Mr. Ritchie was again a dirfector of Heber Creeper, 
Inc. from May 14, 1982 until February 1083. Ex. 8; Ex. 9; Ex. 
10; Complaint, f 5, record at 1; Answer^ record at 9. 
7. Mr. Ritchie was an officer (vice-president) of Heber 
Creeper, Inc. from May 14, 1982 until September 17, 1982. Ex. 8; 
Ex. 9; Ex. 26. 
8. Timoanogos Preservation Society (hereinafter, 
"TPS"), a Utah not-for-orofit corporation, was incorporated on or 
about August 29, 1978. Ex. 10, tr. at 6^, 632. 
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9. Mr. Mendenhall was an incorporator of TPS, was 
approved by Heber Creeoer, Inc.'s president to be a member of the 
Board of Trustees of TPS for the purpose of protecting Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s interests, and was a member of the TPS Board 
uninterruptedly from the time of the incorporation of TPS 
until at least November 30, 1982. Ex. 56; Tr. at 68-69; 131-32; 
397. 
10. Mr. Mendenhall was an officer of TPS uninterrup-
tedly from the time of the incorporation of TPS until at least 
November 30, 1982, and he held the positions, at various times 
during that period, of treasurer, secretary, and secretary-
treasurer. E.g., exs. 5, 11, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, and 56. 
11. Mr. Ritchie was a member of the TPS Board of 
Trustees uninterruptedly from at least July 10, 1981 until at 
least November 30, 1982. E.g., exs. 51, 55, 56; tr. at 695, 
707-09. 
12. Mr. Ritchie was an officer (treasurer) of TPS at 
least during a part of 1982 and was released from that position 
on July 13, 1982. Ex. 40. 
13. Heber Creeper, Inc. operated the train commonly 
known as the "Heber Creeper" (hereinafter "the train") from the 
1971 through 1980 operating seasons. 
14. TPS operated the train during the 1981 and 1982 
operating seasons. Tr. at 572. 
15. The "Heber Creeper" line ran, at all times material 
hereto, from terminal grounds located in Feber City, Wasatch 
County, Utah to the Bridal Veil Falls terminal, located in Provo 
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Canvonf in Utah County, Utah. 
16. Heber Creeper, Inc. 's operation of the train showed 
a small annual average cash loss ($1,085.00) for operatinq 
seasons 1971 through 1980. Ex. 34; tr. at 367-71. 
17. Excluding operating years 1975 and 1976, during 
which years Heber Creeper, Inc. suffere4 cash losses in connec-
tion with certain non-train-operation business interprises, Heber 
Creeper, Inc. showed an annual cash profiit of $2,881.00 for the 
years during which Heber Creeper, Inc. operated the train. Ex. 
34; Tr. at 367-71. 
18. In early 1981, Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS 
discussed, in a series of joint and separate Board meetings, an 
arrangement according to which 
(a) TPS would lease from Hebe it1 Creeper, Inc. the 
right to operate the traih and, 
(b) in connection with that proposed lease arrangement, 
TPS would, among other things, (i) satisfy certain 
debts owed by plaintiff ii)i the amount of at least 
$130,000.00; and (ii) acquire, by paying one dollar 
per share, the then-outst&nding 116,719 shares of 
Heber Creeper, Inc. stockf Ex. 3; Tr. at 
95-100, 536-37, 683. 
19. The arranged-for lease wa$ in fact executed by and 
between Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS (Ex> 3, tr. at 100) but the 
debt retirement and stock purchase arrangement was never consum-
mated. Tr. at 108. 
20. On July 10, 1981, the president of Heber Creeper, 
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Inc. appeared at a TPS Board Meeting and demanded that the TPS 
Board members honor the early 1981 debt-retirement and purchase 
arrangement. Ex. 5; tr. at 104-07. 
21. On August 18, 1981, the TPS Board of Trustees 
approved a proposal that would have, if consummated, caused TPS 
to strike a business agreement with Heber Creeper, Inc. on terms 
at least as favorable to Heber Creeper, Inc. as those con-
templated in early 1981; and Mr. Mendenhall and one Richard Buys, 
fellow TPS Board Member and then-president of TPS, were directed 
to present to Heber Creeper, Inc. the formal proposed so adopted 
by TPS. Ex. 48. 
22. The next day, August 19, 1981, Mr. Mendenhall and 
the said Mr. Buys submitted to Heber Creeper, Inc. a formal pro-
posal which was substantially less favorable to Heber Creeper, 
Inc., than the one so approved by the TPS Board; the one formally 
adopted by the TPS Board the day earlier was deemed by Mr. 
Mendenhall to be not financially feasible from the TPS perspec-
tive. The deal, which wold have been a good deal for Heber 
Creeper, Inc. shareholders, was never consummated. Ex. 6; e.g., 
Ex. 48; tr. at 108-12, 207-08. 219-20, 455, 738. 
23. On May 12, 1982, a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) was 
executed, of which both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie were 
aware, (a) which resolved certain litigation then pending, to 
which Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS and others were signatories; 
(b) which expressly (except for claims asserted in Wasatch County 
Civil Nos. 5720 and 5722, none of which is pertinent hereto) did 
away with and laid to rest any and all past claims and disputes 
- 6 -
between and among its signatories; and (\c) which, among other 
things: (i) required Heber Creeper, Inc. to allow TPS to operate 
the train in operating seasons beginning in 1982; (ii) required 
TPS to oay to Heber Creeper, Inc. 10% ofl the gross income from 
the sale of certain food and non-alcohol[ic beverage sales made in 
connection with the operation of the Heber Creeper train in 
ooerating seasons beginning in 1982, or $10,000.00 per operating 
season, whichever figure was greater; (|ii) required TPS to 
establish, in connection with the operation of the Heber Creeper 
train, accounting procedures in conformity with generally 
accepted principles of accounting so th^t audits and financial 
statements could be adequately prepared^ and (iv) required TPS to 
employ internal and external accounting controls for the purpose 
of assuring an accurate reflection of c^sh intake and expen-
ditures relative to the operation of th$ Heber Creeper train. 
24. Both Mr. Mendenhall and M£. Ritchie were present at 
the May 14, 1982 conclusion of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s 1982 annual 
shareholders meeting, during which those who were present and who 
were about to be named directors, including both Mr. Mendenhall 
and Mr. Ritchie, were informed that if ^hey should accept their 
positions of directors, they would assume fiduciary obligations 
and would breach their fiduciary obligations if they should do 
anything that would undermine the Settlement Agreement referenced 
in the foregoing paragraph 23 hereof. Exs. 8, 9; tr. at 121-22, 
162, 165. 
25. On June 12, 1982, Heber Creeper, Inc.'s Board of 
Directors met, with Mr. Mendenhall present as director and secre-
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tary and at that meeting there was discussed, among other things, 
the concern of one or more directors with respect to the com-
petence and honesty, or lack thereof, of one Mr. Monte Bona, the 
then-manager of TPS, and at that meeting those oresent (all the 
directors of Heber Creeper, Inc. other than Mr. Ritchie) unani-
mously approved a policy of confidentiality with respect to the 
discussion of the corporation's affairs with other parties. Ex. 
27; tr. at 195-200. 
26. On June 14, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall related to the TPS 
Board some of the items that were discussed in the said Heber 
Creeper, Inc. meeting of two days earlier and made the motion 
that the said Mr. Monte Bona be appointed to the Board 06 TPS, 
which motion was seconded and approved. Ex. 38; tr. at 428-29. 
27. From at least as early as July 1982 until at least 
September 1982 Mr. Mendenhall was paid $400.00 oer month by TPS 
for the rendering of accounting and related services to TPS. Ex. 
40; tr. at 589. 
28. At some time prior to June 22, 1982, Mr. 
Mendenhall became av/are of the fact that TPS planned to assert a 
substantial claim against Heber Creeper, Inc. based on matters 
arising prior to the execution of the said Settlement Agreement 
referenced in paragraph 23 hereof; Mr. Mendenhall did not 
apprise HeDer Creeper, Inc. of his said awareness or of the fact 
of such claim prior to June 22, 1982, and no TPS meeting occurred 
between June 22, 1982 and July 1, 1982. Tr. at 180, 487. 
29. On or about June 22, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall submitted 
to Mr. Gene Moore, then-president of Heber Creeper, Inc. a letter 
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of resignation from Mr. Mendenhallfs positions as director and 
secretary-treasurer of Heber Creeper, Ipc. Ex. 14; tr. at 169. 
30. On or about July 1, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall wrote Mr. 
Gene Moore a letter asserting a claim ii(i favor of TPS and against 
Heber Creeper, Inc. in the amount of $3t/737.35, for alleged 
claims that arose, if at all, prior to the execution of the 
aforesaid Settlement Agreement which, or^  its face, extinguished 
all such prior claims. Ex. 2, pp. 11-12; Ex. 7; tr. at 169-70. 
31. Mr. Mendenhall, who was p4id by TPS to do the TPS 
accounting work, failed, both prior to ^nd subsequent to June 
22, 1982, to cause TPS to establish reasonably acceptable 
accounting procedures, and to cause TPS to employ the internal 
and external cash controls required by t|he said Settlement 
Agreement. Tr. at 358-61, 379, 382, 497. 
32. In August 1982, Mr. Ritchip and Mr. Mendenhall took 
the position that the TPS claim against Beber Creeper, Inc. was a 
valid claim. E^g., exs. 41, 42; tr. at ft.71-74, 221-22, 235. 
33. On September 17, 1982, at £ meeting of Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s Board of Directors, Mr. Ritchie was removed as 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s vice president. E£. 26; tr. at 194, 235. 
34. Subsequent to May 14, 1982^ and both prior to and 
subsequent to July 1, 1982, until at lea^t November 30, 1982, 
neither neither Mr. Mendenhall nor Mr. Ritchie took action to 
assure that payments under the said Settlement Agreement would be 
made to Heber Creeper, Inc. Tr. at 220; See, e.g, Exs. 39, 40, 41, 
42, 43, 45, 46. 
35. The regular 1982 train operating season ended on or 
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about Labor Day of that year, the first Monday in September, 
1982, and TPS operated the train throughout the 1982 season. 
36. At all times subsequent to May 14, 1982 until at 
least November 30, 1982, TPS had the ability to pay to Heber 
Creeper, Inc. all sums due under the terms of the said Settlement 
Agreement; TPS, with the concurrence of both Mr. Mendenhall and 
Mr. Ritchie, in effect treated any such sums as an offset against 
the aforesaid pre-Settlement Agreement claims of TPS. E.g., 
Exs. 17, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46; tr. at 171-74, 456, 486. 
37. No payment whatsoever has been made to Heber 
Creeper, Inc. by TPS since the time the said Settlement Agreement 
was executed. Tr. at 200. 
38. Based on the reported 1982 total gross income from 
the operation of the Heber Creeper train and on the historic 
percentage relationship between total gross income and food and 
non-alcoholic beverage gross income experienced in the operation 
of the trainr the food and non-alcoholic beverage gross income of 
TPS for 1982 was projected by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's expert to be 
$173,850.00, that figure was not controverted by other evidence, 
and Heber Creeper, Inc.'s entitlement thereto, oursuant to the 
terms of the said Settlement Agreement, was thus fixed by the 
trial court to be $17,385.00. Ex. 34; tr. at 360-66; Finding of 
Fact No. 49. 
39. Sometime prior to June 22, 1982, a Harriman 
railroad coach belonging to Heber Creeper, Inc. and located on 
the Heber City terminal grounds was gutted by TPS workmen and re-
fitted as a dining car; the seats have been removed from the 
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Heber City terminal grounds and have n^ver been replaced. Tr. at 
265-77, 297-307, 318-31. 
40. During the 1982 train operating season, metal scrap 
belonging to plaintiff was taken from t|he Heber City terminal 
grounds as part of and pursuant to TPS [policies and practices. 
E.g., tr. at 297-304. 
41. Both Mr. Mendenhall and M^ r. Ritchie were on and 
about the terminal grounds on at leat several occasions during 
the time periods that the Harriman coach seats were being removed 
and during the period that the metal sc^ rap was being removed, and 
neither reported to the Heber Creeper, Jnc. Board that such con-
duct was taking pice. Tr. at 201; 247; 301-07; 499-50; 691-92; 
739-40. 
42. The trial court found, witih respect to the failed 
purchase and debt-retirement arrangement} (referenced in the 
foregoing facts numbered 18 through 22) ,| that the evidence did 
not preponderate in favor of Heber Creeper Inc. on its claim that 
Mr. Mendenhall should be held liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in 
the amount of $246,900.00, or in any amolunt, by reason of his 
acts or omissions in connection with tha|t matter. Finding of 
Fact No. 33. 
43. The trial court found, with respect to the non-
payment to Heber Creeoer, Inc. of the mopies it was entitled to 
receive under the 1982 Settlement Agreement (referenced in the 
foregoing facts numbered 23 through 38), by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence, that both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie had 
breached thier duty of care and loyalty io Heber Creeper, Inc., 
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and that Heber Creeper, Inc. had been damaged, as a direct and 
proximate result thereof, in the princioal amount of $17,385.00. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 49 through 52. 
44. The trial court found, with respect to the 
alienation and dissipation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assets during 
the 1982 train operating season ( referenced in the foregoing 
facts numbered 39 through 40), that the evidence did not orepon-
derate in favor of Heber Creeper, Inc. on its claims that Mr. 
Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, or either of them, should be held 
liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in the amount of $35,090.00, or 
in any amount, by reason of their omission in connection with 
that matter. Finding of Fact No. 54. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position herein, based on the 
foregoing statement of indisputable facts and based on other 
facts discussed hereinbelow, in light of the case law of this 
Court and in light of other respected authorities, can be rather 
easily stated. It is (1) that the evidence adduced at trial 
clearly preponderated in its favor with respect to the trial 
court's determination that it was entitled to recover, from Mr. 
Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, the principal amount of $17,385.00 
under the 1982 Settlement Agreement; (2) that the trial court's 
application of relevant law to the evidence adduced in connection 
therewith was clearly correct; (3) that Appellants have advanced 
no cognizable grounds for reversal of the Judgment; (4) that the 
evidence clearly preponderated in favor of Heber Creeper, Inc. 
with respect both to its claim against Mr. Mendenhall in connec-
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tion with the failed 1981 debt-retirement^ and stock purchase 
agreement and with respect to its claims against Mr. Mendenhall 
and Mr. Ritchie in connection with the 1982 disappearance and 
alienation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assess; (5) that the trial 
court found erroneously and against the Clear weight of the evi-
dence in connection with those items; and (5) application of the 
same principles of law to the facts concerning those items a to 
the non-payment of the Settlement Agreemlent monies dictates that 
this Court should modify the trial courtl's judgment to award 
Heber Creeper, Inc. additional damages ^gainst both gentlemen in 
the amounts proven at trial (against Mr. Mendenhall in the total 
additional principal amount of $281f809j00f for a total principal 
amount of $299f194.00; and against Mr. Ritchie in the total addi-
tional principal amount of $35f090.00f 4or a total principal 
amount of $52,475.00). 
Heber Creeper, Inc. hereby respectfully announces that 
it will not further pursue its contention, indicated at pages 2 
and 3 of its Supplemental Docketing Statement on file herein that 
the trial court found against the clear weight of the evidence in 
connection with Heber Creeper, Inc. 's c|laim that it should have 
been awarded additional damages against Mr. Mendenhall, in the 
principal amount of $91,500.00, by reasfcm of Mr. Mendenhall!s 
alleged acts and omissions in connection with the 1980 grant of a 
section of the "Heber Creeper" right-of-way to TPS rather than to 
Heber Creeper, Inc. For it is Heber Cr|eeper, Inc. 's view, on 
reconsideration, that, with respect to that claimed item of 
damage, the trial court could reasonably find, as it did, that 
Heber Creeper, Inc. had not proved its entitlement to recovery. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF BOTH MR. MENDENHALL AND 
MR. RITCHIE FELL FAR SHORT OF THE 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY 
DEMANDED OF DIRECTORS OF UTAH CORPORATIONS. 
A. The Duty of Care 
In Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 P.287 (1899), this 
Court held that directors are bound to 
exercise such a degree of care, skill, and 
diligence as is required by the situation 
and nature of the business. By taking such 
positions, although without compensation, 
directors invite confidence that they possess 
at least ordinary knowledge and skill, and 
that they will do all that men of reasonable 
prudence and caution ought to do to protect 
the interests of stockholders. . . . 
57 P. at 290. In that seminal case, the Court ruled that the 
requisite degree of attention and judgment demanded of corporate 
directors is that which "an ordinarily discreet businessman would 
give to his own concerns under similar circumstances." ^d. at 
291. That degree of concern, according to the Warren Court, 
requires directors to "devote so much of their time to their 
trust as is necessary to familiarize them with the business of 
the institution, and to supervise and direct its operation." Id. 
Nor, ruled the Court, can directors1 lack of due care and dili-
gence be excused "on the ground that they did not know of the 
unfortunate transactions, and were ignorant of the business." 
Id. The standard set in Warren has stood the test of time and is 
still, some 87 years later, the law in Utah. It was expressly 
reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court as recently as 1979 in FMA 
Acceptance Co, v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 13 32, 13 3 4 (Utah 
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1979). 
B. The Duty of Loyalty 
A companion duty owed by Utah business corporation 
directors to their corporations is the di^ ty of loyalty. In Glen 
Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Cp., 77 Utah 36 2, 296 P. 
231, (1931), the Court adopted the following rule of loyalty: 
As long as the confidential relation 
lasts the trustee or other fiduciary 
owes an individual duty to his bene-
ficiary, and cannot olace fiiniself in 
any other position which wbuld subject 
him to conflicting duties or expose 
him to the temptation of acting contrary 
to the best interests of his original 
cestui que trust. The rule applies 
alike to . . . administrators directing 
and managing officers of corporations 
as well as to technical trustees. 
The duty of the directors iof a corpor-
ation is to further the interests and 
business of the association and to 
conserve its property. Any action 
on the part of directors looking to 
the impairment of corporate rights, 
the sacrifice of corporat^ interests, 
the retardation of the objects of the 
corporation, and more especially the 
destruction of the corporation itself, 
will be regarded as a flagrant breach 
of trust on the part of t^ e directors 
engaged therein. 
296 P. at 240-241. 
In Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, In<j:. v. Hall, 414 P. 2d 89 
(Utah 1966), this Court affirmed that this duty of loyalty is 
especially profound when the corportion is in financial 
difficulty: 
a director 
This court has been dedicated to the 
principle that when a corporation is 
in difficulty financially, 
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is duty-bound to render succor, not 
secession, even as a parent would its 
child. 
Id. at 91. As recently as 1982, the Court reaffirmed the 
holdings of both Glen Allen Mining Co. and Hoggan & Hall & 
Higgins, Inc. And in that most recent case, Nicholson v. Evans, 
642 P.2d 627 (Utah 1982), the Court added these observations: 
[Directors] are obligated to use 
their ingenuity, influence, and 
energy, and to employ all the 
resources of the corporation, to 
preserve and enhance the property 
and earning power of the corpor-
ation. . . . This duty extends 
to all of the corporations assets. . . . 
Id. at 629. 
C. Appellants f Breaches 
It should perhaps here be recalled that Heber Creeper, 
Inc.'s claims against Mr. Mendenhall deal with three separate 
matters and the acts and/or omissions of Mr. Mendenhall with 
respect to each: (1) the failure of consummation of the 1981 
arrangement, in connection with which TPS was to acquire the 
stock of Heber Creeper, Inc. and retire Heber Creeper, Inc.fs 
debt; (2) the failure or refusal of TPS to pay Heber Creeper, 
Inc. monies in connection with the 1982 Settlement Agreement; and 
(3) the alienation and dissipation of certain of Heber Creeper, 
Inc. assets during the 1982 operating season. And it is also 
here to be pointed out that Heber Creeper, Inc. claims against 
Mr. Ritchie deal only with the latter two such matters. 
Heber Creeper, Inc. submits that both gentlemen breached 
their duties of loyalty and of care to Heber Creeper, Inc. 
Neither exercised any effort whatsoever on behalf of Heber 
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Creeper, Inc. with respect to the factual1 matters relevant 
hereto. If they had been diligent, they would have acted to 
advance Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests. But they did not. If 
they had been loyal, they would have acted on its behalf. But 
they did not. 
Mr. Mendenhall's entire course pf conduct, as well as 
even his testimony at trial, appears to Evidence a belief that he 
apparently held prior to institution of this litigation and that 
he claimed at trial still to hold, that there is nothing wrong 
with a person's being on the boards of two competing or 
conflicting corporations. Mr. Mendenhall's expressed attitude 
that he was merely carrying out the wishes of TPS, in connection 
with various incidents, that he was merely being, in essence, a 
good soldier, does not comport with the requirements set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court regarding the sol|emn duties of corporate 
directors. Nor does Mr. Ritchie desire to "keep the wheels 
rolling." That TPS may have demanded cqrtain loyalty and care of 
appellants is surely no defense to the fact that, time and time 
again, their actions and omissions which helped TPS seriously 
damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. that Mr. Mer)denhall was suggested for 
intitial TPS Board membership for the pi^ rpose of looking after 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests. 
1. The Failure to Consummate the 
Purchase of Assets and Debt-
Retirement Agreement 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s largest $ingle claim is its claim 
for $246,719.00 against Mr. Mendenhall in connection with the 
failed 1981 purchase and debt-retirement agreement. As indicated 
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by the testimony of Lowe Ashton and as seen on the face of 
Exhibit 3 (minutes of plaintiff's annual stockholders' meeting, 
held April 4, 1981) and Exhibit 36 (handwritten minutes, from 
Bona journal, of TPS February 19, 1981 meeting), a deal was in 
principal reached in early 1981 and in connection with the 
Heber Creeper, Inc.-TPS Lease agreement (Exhibit 4), according to 
which TPS was, among other things, to satisfy at least 
$130,000.00 of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s debt to Ashton Oil and 
Transportation Co. and to pay to Heber Creeper, Inc. one dollar 
for each of the then-outstanding shares of Heber Creeper, Inc. 
stock (the $116,719.00 figure is based on the Heber Creeper, Inc. 
1981 Annual report (Exhibit D ) . Mr. Mendenhall not only failed 
to exert any effort, as the then-sole member of both cor-
porations' boards, and he not only failed to cause the even more 
advantageous and TPS board-approval proposal of August 18, 1981 
(Exhibit 48) to be passed on to Heber Creeper, Inc. for accep-
tance and consummation; he, one day later, along with one other, 
Richard Buys, the then-president of TPS, with no intervening TPS 
Board action, submitted the Auaust 19, 1981 "Prooosal" (Exhibit 
6) to Heber Creeper, Inc., a "Proposal" that was, in short, 
$246,719.00 less advantageous to olaintiff than was the deal that 
Mr. Mendenhall was supposed to cause to be effected. 
Mr. Mendenhall clearly breached his duty of loyalty to 
Heber Creeper, Inc. in connection with these events of 1981. Mr. 
Mendenhall, who testified at trial that he "didn't favor one 
board over the other," also testified that the reason that he 
made the August 19, 1981 Proposal, rather than the one adopted by 
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the TPS Board the day, earlier, was that TfPS the earlier one was 
not in TPS's financial interest. Tr. at 738. He expressed, even 
at trial, no concern over the fact that ^eber Creeper, Inc. lost 
the opportunity, because of his concern for TPS, to acquire a 
most substantial benefit. One of the mo$t telling statements 
made by Mr. Mendenhall in the course of this litigation is his 
statement, made in his deposition and acknowledged at trial (tr. 
at 473-74) in response to Heber Creeper, Inc. 's counsel's obser-
vation that the August 19, 1981 Proposal differed substantiallv 
from the early 1981 arrangement and the prooosal adopted by the 
TPS Board on August 18: "So what? It w^s still a oroposal." 
Heber Creeper, Inc. submits tha|t Mr. Mendenhall failed 
abysmally, in connection with the events of 1981, to discharge 
his duty of care and his duty of loyalty, as defined by this 
Court in the cases cited hereinabove. 
With respect to the matter of Whether the events of 1981 
and Mr. Mendenhall's role therein are prfoperly before the Court 
(see page 5 of Appellants' Brief), Hebe? Creeper, Inc. offers the 
following analysis. Under Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules oE Civil 
Procedure, a pleader is required only tcj> make a short and plain 
statement of his claim. This was expressly recognized by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Blackham v. Snelftrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 
P. 2d 453, 454 (1955), as was the role played by the deoosition-
discovery process in preparation for trial. 280 P.2d at 455. A 
review of the Complaint on file herein Indicates that Heber 
Creeper, Inc. framed that pleading broadly enough to render it 
unnecessary for it to seek to amend prior to trial. The 
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Complaint (record, pp. 1-5) specified certain items of concern 
with regard to the allegedly unlawful acts of the defendants but, 
by use of the phrase "inter alia [among other things]," made it 
clear that there might eventuate, in the course of discovery and 
trial preparation, other specific concerns. Mr. Mendenhall con-
tended at trial that he was surprised by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's 
pursuit of the 1981 purchase and debt-retirement arrangement 
claim and unfairly prejudiced by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's purported 
springing on him of this claim for the first time at trial. 
Heber Creeper, Inc. 's response is that there is no foundation 
whatsoever for Mr. Mendenhall's protestation of surprise and 
prejudice. No fewer than 15 pages (pp. 135-150) of the 
transcript of his deposition are occupied by questions and 
answers dealing with the events of 1981 and his role therein. At 
no point in the course of that questioning did Mr. Mendenhall 
interpose an objection as to relevancy. Tr. at 469-70. He must 
have, in short, realized that Heber Creeper, Inc. had con-
siderable concern in connection with his acts and omissions in 
connection therewith. Then, in what is denominated answer 1(e) 
in its Response, (record, pp. 211-218) dated February 4, 1985 to 
Defendant Gordon Mendenhallfs Interrogatories Heber Creeper, Inc. 
expressed its position that Mr. Mendenhall had breached his fidu-
ciary obligation to Heber Creeper, Inc. with respect to "all 
litigation and pre-litigation disputes between. . . plaintiff 
and. . . Timpanogos Preservation Society...." As Lowe Ashton 
testified at trial, it was when he received, as Heber Creeper, 
Inc.'s president, the August 19, 1981 Proposal signed by 
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TPS that he knew Heber Creeper, Inc. had been "took." Tr. at 
108. 
Heber Creeper, Inc. submits that}, if Mr. Mendenhall was 
not satisfied with the generality of the aforesaid answer 
1(e), he should have filed a motion to ccj>mpel a more specific 
response. Furthermore, in its Amended Response to Defendant 
Mendenhallfs Interrogatories (record, pp, 269-77) and in its 
final proposed Pre-Trial Order (record, pp. 359-76), Heber 
Creeper, Inc. expressly and specifically indicated, on pages, 
respectively, 2 and 11, its intent to pujrsue the 1981 purchase 
and debt-retirement arrangement aspect of its claims against 
Mr. Mendenhall. 
Also, Heber Creeper, Inc. callsi to the Court's attention 
the requirement of Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires that 
every final judgment shall! grant the 
relief to which the party i in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. 
Finally, the trial court appears to haye resolved, in Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s favor, the question of Whether the 1981 debt-
retirement and purchase aspect of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s claim was 
properly before it for trial. For its findings of Fact, nos. 27 
through 33 (see Appellants' Brief at pp,. 36-37) dealt with the 
facts surrounding this aspect of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s claim. 
Mr. Mendenhall is and ought to be held no more free from the 
imposition of liability for his role in| the 1981 events than for 
his other proven misdeeds and, for his 1981 acts and conduct, he 
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is liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in damages in the amount of 
$246,719.00. 
2. The Failure to Cause Payments to 
be Made Under the 1982 Settle-
ment Agreement 
May 12, 1982, the day the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 
2) was executed, was supposed to herald a new day of peace, har-
mony, and fairness for all concerned in the operation of the 
train. The steady erosion, however, of Heber Creeper, Inc. 's 
vitality continued apace. This time Mr. Mendenhall had help, 
however unwitting it may have been, from Mr. Ritchie. Both 
gentlemen resumed their positions as directors of Heber Creeper, 
Inc. on May 14, 1982, minutes after being apprised by former 
Governor of Utah Calvin Rampton of their fiduciary duty to look 
after the interest of Heber Creeper, Inc. and its shareholders 
(Exhibit 9, Minutes of Annual Shareholders1 Meeting, page 13). 
On June 12, 1982, the Heber Creeper, Inc. Board adopted a policy 
of confidentiality in the course of a meeting at which, among 
other things, serious questions were raised concerning TPS and 
its manager, Monte Bona. Ex. 27. On June 14, 1982, two days 
later, Mr. Mendenhall, at a TPS Board meeting, not only breached 
plaintiff's policy of confidentiality; he also nominated Monte 
Bona to a position on the TPS Board. Ex. 38. Eight days later 
Mr. Mendenhall resigned as a director and officer of Heber 
Creeper, Inc. Ex. 14. Nine days after writing his letter of: 
resignation, defendant Mendenhall wrote Heber Creeper, Inc.'s 
president a letter (Exhibit 17) setting forth a debt supposedly 
owing from Heber Creeper, Inc. to TPS which, if it ever existed, 
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had clearly been extinguished by the express terms of the 
Settlement Agreement. (It is undeniably (clear, that any and all 
pre-Settlement Agreement claims of TPS against Heber Creeper, 
Inc. were wiped out when that document was executed. Exhibit 2, 
pp. 11-12). It is indicative of Mr. Mencfenhall' s attitude that 
he testified, at his deposition and admitted at trial (tr. at 
493) that he would have written such a letter, if the TPS Board 
had requested him to do so, even if he had still been a member of 
Heber Creeper, Inc. 's board. The fact tlfiat Mr. Mendenhall had 
resigned 9 days prior to his bringing th£ bogus claim to Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s attention as an excuse npt to pay the food sales 
payments due under the Settlement Agreement does not, in any 
event, render him immune from liability for his post-resignation 
misconduct with respect to acts and polibies which were adverse 
to his corporation's interests and whichi were planned, decided, 
or agreed upon prior to his resignation |but which are manifested 
only after resignation. 
In the aforementioned case of dlen Allen Mining Co. v. 
Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 29^ P. 231 (1931), this 
Court rejected the argument of the defendants, former 
director-officers of the plaintiff corporation, that they were 
shielded from liability because certain acts harmful to the cor-
poration did not come to fruition until the defendants had 
resigned their posts. In that case the evidence was that the 
defendants had developed and put into motion their nefarious plans 
prior to the formal termination of thei^ r fiduciary positions. 
The Glen Allen Mining Co. Court quoted with approval, 296 P. at 
231, the following observation from an Earlier non-Utah case: 
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'Nor is it any defense to the suit 
to enforce this trust that the agency 
had terminated before the confidence 
was violated. The duty of an attorney 
to be true to his client, or of an 
agent to be true to his principalf does 
not cease when the employment ends, and 
it cannot be renounced at will by the 
termination of the relation. It is as 
sacred and inviolable after as before 
the expiration of its term.' 
And in the recent case of Microbiological Research Corporation v. 
Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), the Court reaffirmed the Glen 
Allen Mining Co. rule and restated it as follows: 
[W]here a transaction has its inception 
while the fiduciary relationship is in 
existence, an employee cannot by re-
signing and not disclosing all he knows 
about the [transaction] subsequently 
continue and consummate the transaction 
in a manner in violation of his fiduciary 
duties. 
Id. at 695. 
The inference clearly to be drawn, as the trial court 
apparently did, is that Mr. Mendenhall had knowledge, prior to 
the time of his resignation as a director and officer of Heber 
Creeper, Inc., of the TPS plan, which he, as a TPS board member, 
in all likelihood helped formulate, to pursue the false claim for 
monies due. There is, simply, no record of the occurrence of a 
TPS board meeting between June 22, 1982, the date of Mr. 
Mendenhallfs letter of resignation, and July 1, 1982, the date of 
the letter setting forth the phony claim. Nor could Mr. 
Mendenhall or TPS operative Monte Bona recall, during the trial, 
the holding of any such meeting. Nor could Mr. Mendenhall 
recall having informed Heber Creeper, Inc. 's president, Gene 
Moore, prior to July 1, 1982, of TPS's intent to pursue that 
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claim. Also, Gene Moore testified that t}he first time he had 
knowledge of TPS's intention to pursue ttyat claim was when he 
received Mr. Mendenhallfs July 1, 1982 letter. The law as 
applied to the reasonably inferable fact$ of this case thus leads 
inexorably, as the trial court appears t0 have recognized, to the 
conclusion that Mr. Mendenhall cannot, by virtue of his June 22, 
1982 resignation, escape liability in connection with non-payment 
of the Settlement Agreement-mandated amounts. 
Subsequent to July 1, 1982, Mr, Ritchie and Mr. 
Mendenhall participated in and carried otit the TPS policy of 
utter non-pavment, with the bogus debt u$ad as a continuing 
reason not to pay. The two comprised ha[Lf of the TPS Board 
through at least November 30, 1982 (see Exhibit 56 - Minutes of 
TPS Board meeting of that date). During the TPS Board meeting of 
July 7, 1982 (Exhibit 39), Mr. Mendenhal|l seconded a motion 
(which, like all the many motions that a|re memorialized in the 
various TPS minutes that are part of the record in this case, was 
unanimously passed by those trustees pre|sent) that, rather than 
cash payment of food sales percentages, due, "credit" be given on 
the bogus debt. No money was ever paid,) despite the clear abi-
lity of TPS to make the payments as they) fell due. 
Mr. Ritchie's defense of his rc^ le in the non-payment and 
of his role in attempting to thwart Heb^r Creeper, Inc.'s 
obtaining of legal services to pursue the debt that was so 
clearly owed (tr. at 235-36) and that w^s so clearly not about to 
be paid can be distilled to his professed desire to keep the 
wheels a-rollin1 and to give TPS as goocj a chance and apparently 
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as long a chance (10 years or so) as Heber Creeper, Inc. had had 
to make a return to Heber Creeper, Inc.'s shareholders on their 
investments. Tr. 237-38, 519-27. Despite Mr. Ritchie's trial 
counsel's valiant efforts, it has clearly been established that 
Mr. Ritchie was indeed both a director of Heber Creeper, Inc. and 
a trustee of TPS throughout the 1982 season. (See, e.g. exs. 9, 
5, 56). Mr. Ritchie's virtual carte-blanche trust in TPS and 
Monte Bona and unwavering disinterest in and hostility for Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s aggressive pursuit of its Settlement Agreement 
claim against TPS clearly establish his failure to live up to the 
duty of the highest good faith that the law required of him while 
he was a member of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s Board of Directors. He 
was, like Mr. Mendenhall, disloyal to Heber Creeper, Inc. He too 
breached confidentiality by reporting to the TPS board, on 
September 28, 1982 (Exhibit 46), on the goings-on of Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s Board meeting of Seotember 17, 1982 (Exhibit 26) 
and retention of legal counsel. Mr. Ritchie was not only 
disloyal. He also clearly breached his duty of care as defined, 
hereinabove, by this Court. He acknowledged, at trial (tr. at 
523) the admission, made in his deposition, that he didn't check 
the facts, though "maybe" he should have. Unfortunately for Mr. 
Ritchie, the law of the State of Utah does not recognize figure-
head directors. He undertook a solemn duty to concern himself 
with the protection of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests and he, 
like defendant Mendenhall, abjectly failed adequately to 
discharge that duty. 
The uncontroverted testimony of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s 
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expert, C.P.A. Ron King, not only thoroughly debunked the notion 
presented to the trial court that virtually anything (i.e., 
unfettered TPS control) was worth a try ^fter the supposedly 
horrendous financial failure of the train operation while it was 
under Heber Creeper, Inc.'s control. Mr. Kinq also 
offered credible and similarly uncontrov^rted testimony (see 
Exhibit 34 and tr. at 357-66, that $17,3^5.00, rather than the 
$10,000.00 minimum, is the amount for which Mr. Mendenhall and 
Mr. Ritchie should be held liable to Heb^r Creeper, Inc. in con-
nection with non-payment under the Settlement Agreement. 
3. The Allowance of the Dissipation and 
Alienation of Heber Creeper, Inc. 's 
Assets During 1982 
Mr. Craig Drury, former operations manager for the 
train, testified that in or about February of 1982 he brought to 
Mr. Mendenhallfs attention certain concerns he had with the 1981 
train operation and particularly the practices of operations 
manager Monte Bona. Tr. at 257-65. The Credible testimony was 
that Mr. Mendenhall told Mr. Drury in th^t conversation, that he, 
Mr. Mendenhall, did not trust Monte Bonaj. Nonetheless, the 1982 
operating season again found Monte Bona ht the helm. According 
to the uncontroverted testimony of Willijam Schultz, by the time 
Mr. Mendenhall (who never has decided exiactly what story to tell 
about why he resigned from Heber Creeper), Inc. 's Board; (see, 
e.g. , tr. at 399-406; 727-28) quit his f^ eber Creeper, Inc. posts 
on June 22, 1982, the historic Harriman coach had been gutted and 
the valuable scrap metal pile had been Substantially depleted. 
Tr. at 295-307. The work was done in daylight, as part of regu-
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lar TPS operations. Tr. at 303. Both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. 
Ritchie, according to the testimony of both Mr. Schultz and 
former TPS president Richard Buysf spent considerable time during 
the 1982 season, before and after June 22 of that year, on and 
around the train terminal grounds where the pilferage occurred. 
Neither gentleman lifted a finger to stop the alienation and 
dissipation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assets. Maybe they 
knew what was happening. Maybe they did not. The point is that 
they should have known, they should have cared, and they should 
have done soemthing to stop it. Even if they did not have the 
visceral wherewithal to stand up to Monte Bona or whoever else 
was destroying what were then some of the most valuable of 
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s remaining assets, they should have alerted 
the Heber Creeper, Inc. Board to what was going on. As the trial 
court observed, it is obvious what Heber Creeper, Inc. 's presi-
dent, Gene Moore, would have done if he had been informed of what 
was happening to his corporation's assets under the auspices of 
the TPS operation. He would have taken steps to stop it. Tr. at 
202. Both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, perhaps even more par-
ticularly Mr. Mendenhall because of the warning he had been given 
by Mr. Drury, either were aware or should have been aware of what 
was happening. And both, if they had cared, would have known 
what was happening and would have taken steps to halt it. But 
nothing was done to stop the continued erosion of Heber Creeper, 
Inc.fs assets. Whether it was a simple lack of care or further 
acts of disloyalty will probably never be known. But the former 
possibility is obvious, and the latter may fairly be inferred. 
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Again both Appellants acted, or [failed to act, in a 
manner that clearly fell short of the reqjuirements established by 
this Court. The damages suffered by Heb^r Creeper, Inc. as a 
result of Appellants' misconduct in this regard, according to the 
credible testimony - that Mr. Murl Rawlins - is $35,090.00, said 
total representing the estimated total c0st of restoration of the 
Harriman coach to its pre-gutting conditijon ($24,590.00) plus the 
estimated value ($10,500.00) of the scra$ metal that disappeared. 
Exhibit 32; tr. at 310-30, 343-49). 
POINT II 
BOTH APPELLANTS ARE LEGALLY CHARGEABLE 
WITH DAMAGES VISITED UPON HEBfR CREEPER, INC. 
In Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 2$9, 57 P.287 (1899), 
discussed hereinabove, some of the defendants, directors and 
officers of a banking corporation, were fclso directors of other 
corporate entities to which loans were m£de on questionable and 
suspicious terms and which failed to rep^y and defaulted on the 
loans. This Court, in the course of reversing the trial court's 
nonsuit against several of the directors, did not concern itself 
with precisely what role any of the directors played in the 
defaulting entities1 non-payment of the lloans. The focus of the 
Court's concern in that case was not on the defaulting entities 
at all. It was on the attitude and cond|uct of the banking cor-
poration's directors. Heber Creeper, In|c. commends the entire 
case to the Court's attention and suggesjts that the teachings of 
the case include the notion that, where a corporation's direc-
tor's conduct and attitude are shoddy enough, in connection with 
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his delegation of authority and his dealings with third parties, 
an inference, if not, indeed, a legal presumption, may arise to 
the effect that that director is legally answerable to his cor-
poration for damges suffered in connection with his questionable 
acts. Some of the facts of the Warren Court's observations seem 
to almost foretell things that happened in the instant case. 
Those observations include the following: 
It is certainly quite startling to 
notice that a bank in the hands of 
honest business men, as the directors 
and officers were reputed to be, 
should in so short a space of time 
meet with so many heavy losses as to 
actually wreck the institution. 
57 P. at 287. 
The directors were not intended to 
be mere figureheads without duty or 
responsibility. 
Id. at 289. 
The duties of directors are administrative, 
relate to supervision and direction, 
and when it is sought to hold them 
responsible for a dereliction of duty, 
because of which a loss occurred to 
stockholders and creditors, they can-
not evade liability by pleading ignor-
ance of the affairs of the institution, 
incompetency, or gratuitous service, 
or that the management of banking 
business was in the hands of the 
cashier or other executive officer. 
Id. at 290. 
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826-829 
(N.J. 1981), the unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court offered the 
most thorough and compelling analysis Heber Creeper, Inc. 's coun-
sel has been able to locate on the question of proximate causa-
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tion of damages in a setting analogous t0 that now before the 
Court. Plaintiff commends that entire analysis to the Court's 
attention and here offers the following excerpt: 
In assessing whether Mrs. pritchard1s 
conduct was a legal or proximate cause 
responsibility of the conversion, " [l]ega 
must be limited to those ciuses which are 
so closely connected with phe result and of 
such significance that the 
in imposing liability." pro 
icial 
law is justified 
sserf supra, § 
41 at 237. Such a jud determination 
involves not only considerations of cusa-
tion-in-fact and matters or policy, but 
also common sense and logic. Caputzal v. 
The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77-78, 222 
A.2d 513 (1966). The act br the failure to 
act must be a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the harm. Prosser, supra, § 41 at 
240; Restatement (Second) pf Torts, §§ 431, 
432 (1965). 
, several factors 
the funds: 
Within Pritchard and Baird 
contributed to the loss of 
commingling of corporate and client monies, 
conversion of funds by Cha 
William and dereliction of 
Mrs. Pritchard. The wrongdoinq of her sons, 
although the immediate cause of the loss, 
should not excuse Mrs. Pri| 
negligence which also was 
rles, Jr. and 
her duties by 
tchard from her 
a substantial fac-
tor contributing to the loss. Restatement 
§ 442B, comment 
the only other 
(Second) of Torts, supra, 
b. Her sons knew tht she,! 
director, was not reviewing their conduct; 
they spawned their fraud in the backwater of 
her neglect. Her neglect of duty contri-
buted to the climate of corruption; her 
failure to act contributed to the con-
tinuation of that corruption. 
Consequently, her conduct was a substantial 
factor contributing to th$ loss. 
Analysis of proximate cau 
difficult in a corporate 
allegation is that nonfea 
tor is a proximate cuse o 
third party.... Where a c 
feasance, no one can say, 
certainty what would have 
defendant had acted other 
supra, § 41 at 242. None 
is reasonable to conclude 
>e is especially 
:ontext where the 
>ance of a direc-
damage to a 
Lse involves non-
"with absolute 
occurred if the 
ise." Prosser, 
heless, where it 
that the failure 
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to act would produce a particular result 
and that result has followed, causation may 
be inferred. Ibid. We conclude that even 
if Mrs. Pritchard1s mere objection had not 
stopped the depredations of her sons, her 
consultation with an attorney and the 
threat of suit would have deterred them. 
That conclusion flows as a matter of common 
sense and loqic from the record. Whether 
in other situations a director has a duty 
to do more than protest and resign is best 
left to case-by-case determinations. In 
this case, we are satisfied that there was a 
duty to do more than object and resign. 
Consequently, we find that Mrs. Pritchard's 
negligence was a proximate cause of the 
misappropriations. 
To conclude, by virtue of her office, Mrs. 
Pritchard had the power to prevent the 
losses sustained by the clients of 
Pritchard & Baird. With power comes respon-
sibility. She had a duty to deter the 
depredation of the other insiders, her sons. 
She breached that duty and caused plain-
tiffs to sustain damages. 
432 A.2d at 828-829. For the Court's information, Pritchard and 
Baird was the corporation. The estate of Mrs. Pritchard was 
a defendant. Plaintiffs included the corporation's trustee in 
bankruptcy. In analogizing the facts of that case to the facts 
of the instant case, the Court should, Heber Creeper, Inc. 
suggests, focus on the equities of the instant case, the Francis 
court's application of the Prosser and Restatement rules 
referenced therein, and the conduct of Messrs. Mendenhall and 
Ritchie herein. If the Court determines that it is not egre-
giously disloyal or nefarious acts of the Appellants that have 
damaged Heber Creeper, Inc., but rather that it was TPS as an 
entity or Monte Bona, or some combination of actors or factors 
that have worked, in whole or in part, directly to visit the sub-
ject damages upon Heber Creeper, Inc., the Court should at least 
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conclude that the subject damages were suffered as a result of 
acts and conduct, in the words of the Frajncis Court, "spawned in 
the backwater of [Apoellants'] neglect." rd. at 829. 
At the conclusion of trial the t^ rial court queried as to 
the significance of the role played by orie director with respect 
to corporate action taken by a board of 1|4 or 15 members that 
damages another corporation of which such a director is also a 
board member. Tr. at 790-91. Heber Creeper, Inc. concedes that 
if TPS had been a corporation with such 4 large number of 
trustees, Heber Creeper, Inc. 's case against Apoellants might be 
much more difficult. The point, howeverf is that, as with the 
Francis case, the TPS Board was a small board. The corporation 
in Francis had a 3-member board. The TPS Board never had, it 
appears, more than 4 or 5 members. Throughout 1982 it had, 
apparently, but 4: Mr. Mendenhall, Mr. Ritchie, Richard Buys, 
and, for part of the year, Monte Bona. $eber Creeoer, Inc. 
submits that it is not only logical but JLn accordance with the 
foregoing legal analysis to conclude (1) that the smaller the 
governing body is the greater is the influence, for good or for 
ill, that a director or trustee wields afid can be expected to 
wield; and (2) that, on the facts of thijs case, there is no impe-
diment to the Court's holding both Appellants liable for acts and 
conduct that damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. and that were the pro-
duct of what appears to be TPS Board-applroved action. 
Finally, of further guidance ma|y be a very recent Utah 
Supreme Court case, one that is more genjeral in its reach than 
what is required here, but one that aop^ars to have considerable 
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bearing on the issue of liability of both Appellants to the 
extent that they have tried to paint themselves as mere agents of 
TPS. In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, (Utah 1985), this 
Court adopted the following standard: 
If an agent commits a tort while 
acting on behalf of his principal , 
the fact that he is an agent does 
not insulate him from liability 
to the injured party. The agent's 
liability is determined solely 
upon the common-law obli-
gation that every person 
must so act or use that 
which he controls as not 
to injure another. . . . 
[W]hether he is acting on 
his own behalf or for 
another, an agent who violates 
a duty which he owes to a 
third person is answerable 
to the injured party for 
the consequences. It is 
no excuse to an agent that 
his principal is also liable 
for a tort . . . Nor is an 
agent who is guilty of 
tortious conduct relieved 
from liability merely be-
cause he acted at the re-
quest, or even at the com-
mand or direction, of the 
principal, unless he is 
exercising a privilege of 
the principal to commit 
the act. 
Id. at 699 (quoting from 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 300). Neither Mr. 
Mendenhall nor Mr. Ritchie can find sanctuary in his contention 
that it was TPS, not he, that damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. And 
Heber Creeper, Inc. contends, the trial court correctly aoplied 
the rule of personal liability to the acts and omissions of both 
Appellants in connection with the non-payment of the 1982 
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Settlement Agreement entitlements and incorrectly applied it in 
finding no liability against Mr. Mendenhall in connection with 
the failed 1981 purchase and debt-retirement arrangement and 
against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie in connection with 
the 1982 dissipation and alienation of H^ber Creeper, Inc. 
assets. 
POINT III 
THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY APPELLANTS ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY UTAH LAW, ARE BASED ON 
INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE RECORD EVIDENCE, 
AND MUST FAIL. 
A
• The Duration of Directors' Fiduciary Duty 
At pages 8 and 9 of their Brieff Appellants have brought 
to the Courtfs attention a number of encyclopedic references and 
cases from Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming Which appear to stand for 
the general proposition that a director'£ fiduciary duty to his 
corporation terminates as of the time of termination of his 
directorship. Application of this argument is apparently 
intended to be limited to Mr. Mendenhall), inasmuch as Mr. Ritchie 
was unquestionably a director of Heber C^ reeoer, Inc. from May 14, 
1982 until February 1983 and (Ex. 27) wab removed only as Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s Vice President on September 17, 1982. (It should 
here be recalled that the Judgment from Which Appellants have 
appealed is limited to the non-payment ojf: funds to which Heber 
Creeper, Inc. was entitled for the 1982 (season and is founded on 
the May 12, 1982 Settlement Agreement (E|x. 2)). As to Mr. 
Mendenhall, Appellants1 argument fails t^> address the ongoing 
nature of a director's duties spelled ou|t, as quoted on p. 15 
- 35 -
hereof, by this Court in Glen Allen Mining Co, v. Park Galena 
Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P. 231 (1931). Nor does Appellants1 
argument seek to apply the relevant language of this Court in 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), 
to the facts of this case. Heber Creeper, Inc. respectfully sub-
mits its analysis of the facts of this case, set forth at pp. 
24-25 hereof, in light of the relevant language of Muna quoted at 
p. 24 hereof. It appears quite clear, as the trial court herein 
found, that Mr. Mendenhall cannot escape liability merely because 
he resigned his Heber Creeper, Inc. position nine days before he 
made written demand for payment to TPS of a debt which, if it 
ever existed, had clearly been extinguished by the Settlement 
Agreement. 
B. The Supposed Efforts to Cause the 1982 
Settlement Agreement Monies to Be Paid 
At pages 10 and 11 of their Brief, Appellants have 
apparently sought to characterize themselves as having been con-
sistently desirous that the monies due Heber Creeper, Inc. from 
TPS be paid. As is pointed out hereinbelow, the record simply 
does not support such a position. Nor, incidentally, and contrary 
to the statement made thrice at those pages of Appellants1 Brief, 
was Mr. Monte Bona ever president of TPS. And to the extent that 
the Court is inclined to qive weight, with respect to any of the 
issues presented on appeal, to any of Mr. Bona!s testimony 
contrary to Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position, the Court is respect-
fully directed to review the lengthy impeachment Exhibit 62, 
referenced at pp. 784-86 of the transcript, as well as the 
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transcript at 652-663 and 679-70, to acquire a feel for Mr. 
Bonaf s aoparent lack of respect for the jjudicial process. 
Mr. Mendenhall himself testified! (tr. at 445) that he 
had TPS authority to cut checks. And even if Mr. Bona told Mr. 
Mendenhall not to make the payments, Mr. Bona had no authority to 
do so. Mr. Bona was, as of September 7, 198 2, merely, like Mr. 
Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, one of a handful of TPS Board mem-
bers. The record does not appear to indicate that Mr. Bona held 
any corporate office. Furthermore, the record is replete with 
references to the fact that, prior to th^ TPS meeting of 
September 7, 1982, the supposed debt owed TPS by Heber Creeper, 
Inc. was used as a reason not to pay any part of Heber Creeper, 
Inc.'s Settlement Agreement entitlement. 
With respect to concessionaire Gordon Wheeler's supposed 
failure to give an acounting to TPS of fjood sales, that would 
certainly not excuse the TPS trustees, ijncludincr Mr. Mendenhall 
and Mr Ritchie, from making at least substantial payment on the 
$10,000.00 minimum due Heber Creeper, Ir\c. Furthermore, Mr. 
Wheeler was not rquired to give an accounting to Heber Creeper, 
Inc. Tr. at 125. 
With respect to Mr. Ritchie's ifole in the non-payment, 
the record is clear, as indicated at pp1 25-26 hereof, that he was 
concerned not with causing Heber Creepetf, Inc. to be paid the 
monies it was clearly entitled to receiye, but rather to keep the 
wheels of the train rolling and to give TPS as much time, 
apparently, as TPS wanted before payment was to be forthcoming. 
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C. The Sufficient Basis for the Award of 
The Amount Ordered by the Trial Court 
At pages 11 to 14 of their Brief, Appellants have con-
tended that the evidence on which the trial court determined the 
amount due Heber Creeper, Inc. ($17,38 5.00) under the terms of 
the 1982 Settlement Agreement was insufficient to support that 
determination and the concomitant award of judgment against 
Messrs. Mendenhall and Ritchie in that amount. The trial court's 
determination that that was the appropriate amount, rather than 
the $10,000.00 minimum mandated by the Settlement Agreement, or 
any other amount, was apparently based on the testimony of Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s expert, C.P.A. Ronald K. King, exhibit 34, and 
the failure of TPS and it paid accountant, Mr. Mendenhall, to 
provide Mr. King any records other than those (proffered Exhibit 
33, which was not received) presented him by Mr. John Roberts, an 
agent of TPS. Appellants have cited no authority for their pro-
position (Appellants' Brief, p. 11) that Exhibit 34 should not 
have been received. Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position is that Mr. 
King's methodology (tr at 361-66), of comparing the historical 
percentage relationship of ridership dollars to food sales 
dollars to the ridership figures presented to him by Mr. Roberts, 
was sound, and that the trial court did not err in receiving Mr. 
King's testimony or Exhibit 34. 
With respect to the reduction of monies due under the 
Settlement Agreement apparently claimed by Appellants 
(Appellants' Brief at 13) by virtue of the supposed 
"unavailability" of the NARFAM coaches, Heber Creeper, Inc.'s 
response is simple: there is no record evidence whatsoever that 
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those coaches, or any of them, were ever in fact "unavailable" to 
TPS. They were, regardless of any msigiyings which anyone may 
have had, in fact used by TPS throughout the 1982 operating 
season. Even Mr. Monte Bona has admitted this fact. Tr. at 698. 
The trial court's determination that $17,385.00 was the 
amount that Heber Creeper, Inc. should h^ve received under the 
Settlement Agreement was and remains, ba£ed on the record herein, 
unassailable. 
D
• The Insufficiency of M K Ritchie's 
Claim That He Acted as "Peacemaker" 
At page 14 of their Brief, Appellants have sought, as 
was attempted at trial, to exonerate Mr. Ritchie from liability 
on the claimed basis that he acted, in a[Ll resoects material 
hereto, as a "peacemaker"; that he sought to act "in the interest 
of the train"; that he "represented both parties fairly and was 
interested in running a railroad"; and t^at his object in serving 
as a director of Heber Creeper, Inc. was to "stop the lawsuits." 
It is perhaps of note that no such claimi of neutrality is made on 
behalf of Mr. Mendenhall. With respect Ito Mr. Ritchie, Heber 
Creeper, Inc.'s position has been made, it is confident, abun-
dantly clear: the law of this State, asj set forth in the deci-
sions of this Court cited hereinabove, Remands, of directors of 
Utah for-profit corporations, vigilance and aggressive pursuit 
of the corporation's interests. Mr. Ritchie's acts and 
omissions, as discussed hereinabove and even, Heber Creeper, Inc. 
suggests, as characterized on page 14 of| Appellants' Brief, fall 
far short of that standard. 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants should not have done what they did to damage 
Heber Creeper, Inc., and should have done things that they did 
not do to protect Heber Creeper, Inc. They let their corporation 
down, and they broke the promise that the law required of them to 
work with the highest good faith to advance their corporation's 
interest. Liability of both was clearly established at trial, 
and Heber Creeper, Inc. urges the Court to sustain the trial 
court's awards in connection with the non-payment of 1982 
Settlement Agreement entitlements and to modiFy the Judgment to 
provide that Heber Creeper, Inc. is entitled to recover the prin-
cipal amount of $299,194.00 against Gordon Mendenhall and to 
recover the principal amount of $52,475.00 against Leon Ritchie. 
Respectfully submitted this ~r~ day of April, 1986. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
Attorney for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
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